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Teaching Civil Procedure
By CUTHBERT W. POUND'
The early lawyer saw the law in the form of an action. Right and
wrong grew out of such forms. Unless there was a remedy there was
no right. "So great is the ascendency of the law of action in the
infancy of courts of justice, that substantive law has at first the look
of being gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure." (Maine's
Early Law and Custom, 389). The study of law was the study of
practice. That, however, was a long way back. The New York Code
of Civil Procedure provides for one form of civil action, declares that
the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity has been
abolished, and says that the plain and concise statement of the facts
constituting the cause of action, defense or counterclaim, is sufficient.
Simplicity is thus suggested. The Code contains, or has contained
nearly 3,500 sections, each one a dangerous pitfall for the unwary.
Court rules add to the perplexity. Detail, whereby the weightier
matters of the law are disregarded while tithe is taken of the mint,
anise and cummin, is thus inevitable.
Under these conditions it is not strange if the modem student looks
upon substantive law as a philosophic development of principles and
regards simplified procedure as a system which, promising freedom
from technicality, is, in truth, one of technical forms unrelated to the
merits of the controversy. The end of procedure is to make plain the
essential fact and to bring speedily a decision. Remedial justice
makes litigation an appeal to reason rather than to force or fetish.
If all went smoothly, the law of rights would be enough, but without
some degree of skill in the preparation and trial of cases, a knowledge
of the general rules of substantive law is a vain thing in a litigious
world. With experience in the art or trade of legal presentation a
mediocre practitioner may succeed in moving a tribunal to favorable
action. Without such skill, the most learned jurist may be unable to
make a start. It follows that the law school which neglects to develop
a proper foundation for the trial of issues because it is the work of the
artisan rather than the scholar graduates brief makers who must learn
somewhere how to practice law; men who are full of theory and
abstractions but who have no handicraft; splendid raw material, but
not a finished product.
'Associate Judge of the New York Court of Appeals. Professor in the Cornell
University College of Law from 1895 to I0O4.
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Courses on Common Law Pleading, based on the distinction
between natural logic and legal logic, and an acquired taste for the
beauty of a system wherein everything depends upon the mode of
statement, and on Evidence, based on the exclusionary rules which
guard the tribunal from deflecting facts, may be taught with the effect
of exaggerating the difficulties of procedure in the mind of the average
student until he is doubtful that anything can be properly pleaded or
properly proved, at least by his opponent. Such instruction has its
proper value but it is inadequate What could be more disheartening
than for afreshman in law, to begin his work in procedure with Ames's
Cases on Common Law Pleading, x, and to learn, if he can grasp the
meaning of the law Latin and archaic English, that there is an obscure
case in Jenkins' Century Cases, 133, (A. D. 1474) in which the plaintiff
seems to have put in both a replication and a demurrer to the plea, but
it may be imperfectly reported, and may not have been the exception
to the general rule which it appears? Such words are unrelated to his
life; a historical curiosity. Later from his courses in substantive law
he soon gets the impression that a law suit may be conducted without
pleadings and that proof may be made of essential facts with no great
formality and concludes that substantive law alone has a present
educational value.
In this conclusion he is confirmed by the discovery that the details
of trial practice have been deliberately ignored in some of our best law
schools and slighted in many others. The atmosphere of the class
room has been kept clear of the stuffiness of the court room. Dean
Pound of Harvard said, at the Association of American Law Schools
in 19r3, "I think it is quite possible for us to emphasize unduly this
matter of trial practice; and if we are patient we may find that we can
get along in another decade pretty well in the paths in which we have
been going." The confession is often made, as by Professor Peck of
Yale at the same meeting, that law school instruction cannot be given
in procedure with the degree of success and usefulness that attends
other courses. Some have not hesitated to say that such instruction
has been an absolute failure. Too much may be sacrificed by refusing
to comprehend the import of such a failure. We may, if we feel dis-
posed, admit that the certainty and simplicity of the common law
have been superseded by what Baron Parke would term the scandal
of loose pleadings and lax practice and an unscientific method of con-
ducting a law suit. We cannot deny that law is largely a matter of
sources and that its history and evolution must not be neglected.
But one cannot follow the course of a law suit to a successful end
merely by condemning code procedure as basely mechanical and
beneath the'attention of the scholarly mind. It is unnecessary to
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trace the origin of legal forms in order to comprehend their practical
use. The common law practitioner who in the middle of the last cen-
tury found himself overwhelmed with the novelties of a new system
was excusable when he protested that the Code was a meaningless
jumble out of which confusion came, but the present day law student
is not concerned with antiquarian research in comparative jurispru-
dence. He has read that the doctrines of substantive law may often
be traced to some forgotten circumstance of procedure, but he knows
that lawyers take little interest in the history of the action of assump-
sit. The grace of scholarship adorns the discussions of the forum, but
it has its practical limitations. An eminent jurist wrote a long and
learned opinion reviewing many old authorities pointing to a certain
result, and ended with the words: "This would be the conclusion I
would reach had not the Court of Appeals held otherwise last year
the case of Av. B." Most wise jurist, not to advance, in deciding the
difficulties of the actual litigants, beyond the point where the court
of last resort left off. A jurist may be impractical. A lawyer cannot
afford to be. In order to be practical the law schools should take our
legal practice as it is and endeavor to indoctrinate the student in some
knowedge of how he may, after discovering the rule of substantive
law applicable to his client's case, guide the cause through the laby-
rinth of a law suit from the time when jurisdiction is obtained over
person or property, past the development of the facts by the examina-
tion of witnesses on the trial and the jurisdictional puzzles of the
appellate courts, and in the end so operate the'legal machinery for the
collection of his judgment that fraud and concealment may not defeat
his hard earned victory.
Cornell has never failed to appreciate the practical needs of instruc-
tion in the conduct of law suits and the practical difficulties in the way.
It has upheld aii ideal without claiming that it has reached the final
solution of the problem. It has not been discouraged by the fact
that the details of practice can be mastered, if ever, only after years of
varied experience. After somewhat feeble struggles in the direction
of efficient instruction, it has developed a complete practice depart-
ment, with courses extending through three years, supplemented by
a practice court devoted to practical exercises in the preparation,
commencement, maturing and trial of issues, both of law and of fact,
with and without juries; the selection of the jury; the opening state-
ment; the examination of witnesses; the taking and preserving
exceptions; offers of proof; instructions; the argument of the case;
proceedings subsequent to verdict, and the preparation of the record
for appeal. The foundation for this work was laid by Professor
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Henry S. Redfield. His successors Judge Irvine and Professors Stagg
and McCaskill have extended the work.2
The task of teaching practice is lacking in attractiveness. In the
first place, procedure must struggle for proper recognition in a crowded
schedule. It must assert its equality with other courses. Then the
courses must command the respect of the students. The teacher
must possess unusual personality to make the practice department a
success. In order to make the drudgery divine, the enthusiasm of the
optimist, the industry of the galley slave and the accuracy of the table
of logarithms should be combined with ripe learning and wide exper-
ience and the foresight which anticipates the future. The student
must actually apply the rules of procedure to real or assumed facts.
He must go through the motions himself. The effort to teach a young
man the functions of an affidavit of regularity or a writ of prohibition
or a warrant of attachment merely by definitions from a text book or
illustrations from a case book is perhaps the most complete waste of
valuable time under the guise of educational effort that can be sug-
gested. Some details of practice can be mastered if the instructor will
give much time and attention to the efforts of the beginner to put them
on paper or in form before something that can be staged to resemble,
not that strange weird thing, the common mock court, but a real
court. But no stimulant of a fee serves to heighten the illusion and
teacher and student alike find their interest more readily aroused by
the entertaining narrative of the facts in tort, domestic relations or
even contract. Ample time must be given for careful preparation and
the correction of errors. Hasty, slipshod work, prepared in unlawyer-
like fashion, must not be tolerated. Deliberation, accuracy and
thoroughness must be insisted upon when bluff and clever advocacy
are presented as a substitute. The dull and indolent must not be
allowed to suck their sustenance from their more diligent classmates.
The work must change from year to year, so that it may not become a
lifeless formula to be handed down with accumulating errors from
class to class. A fact familiar to every teacher is that few men who
come to law schools to prepare to become lawyers are greedy to con-
sume all the wholesome food which is offered to them and that many
are content with the husks of other men's labors. Minds thus
nourished do not mature except in the cunning use of the book of
forms and the record of cases which tell how success may be won by
imitation rather than comprehension.
The medical school does not aim merely to turn out men of high
2For an interesting account of the practice court work now conducted at Cor-
nell by Professor McCaskill, see his "Methods of Teaching Practice," 2 Cornell
Law Quarterly 299.
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character and fine intellectual powers. It aims to fit its graduates to
meet the need of the community for skillful physicians and surgeons.
The dental school would be ridiculous which would give its degree to a
man who knew the anatomy of a tooth but did not know how to care
for it properly until he had served an apprenticeship. The lawyer
should be fitted by the law school for proficiency in the elements of his
technical work. He should be able to protect his client without undue
aid from the court. I have faith in the success of instruction in proce-
dure so long as the aim is to teach the essentials of the procedure of a
given jurisdiction. One trouble is that the attempt to teach general
principles results in developing a notion of procedure that prevails
nowhere. Another dangeris that inlearning technicalities the student
may become inclined to use them as a weapon of offense rather than
protection. A hastily prepared lawyer may be excused for petti-
fogging, for he may be unaware of his own meanness, but the big men
use technicalities only as the orderly administration of justice requires
and not as a means of annoying an opponent. Technicalities are use-
ful as they save time, not as they waste it.
Another reaction to be hoped for from the more careful attention to
procedure by the law schools is the simplification of practice. That
work could be materially promoted by law teachers and lawyers
specially trained under them. Reformed procedure is somewhat of a
gibberish. It is complex. It is inexact. The proper application of
its rules is uncertain. It may be made a science more tersely stated
than the five fat volumes of Bliss's Annotated Code now state the law
of New York and its judicial interpretations. Practicing lawyers have
neither the time nor the interest to go to the heart of this subject. I
do not disparage the work of the Board of Statutory Consolidation in
the reform of New York Procedure, but the work I have in mind has a
wider field and a broader aim. Law teachers and judges are disin-
terested votaries of the goddess of jurisprudence. Judicial reform of
procedure consists chiefly in checking the tendency to become unduly
technical; in liberalizing the existing rules. The courts have no
power to amend or repeal the laws and judicial reform is local. The
rules governing the settlement of disputes in the courts should be
uniform throughout the United States. Uniform laws on Negotiable
Instruments, Sales, Partnership and other subjects have proved prac-
ticable and the parts of practice should be as easily standardized as are
the parts of a watch or an automobile. Marshal Foch, the great
leader of the great war was a professor of military science. The sim-
plified and standardized law suit might well be the invention of the
professors of procedure.
